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Altruism is a malleable notion that is understood differ-
ently in various disciplines. The common denominator of
most definitions of altruism is the idea of unidirectional
helping behaviour. However, a closer examination reveals
that the termaltruismsometimes refers to theoutcomesof
a helping behaviour for the agent and its neighbours –
that is, reproductive altruism – and sometimes to what
motivates the agent to help others – that is, psychological
altruism.Since theseperspectivesonaltruismarecrucially
different, it is important to use a clear terminology to
avoid confusion. In particular, we show that the notion of
altruism used by biologists profoundly differs from the
ones used by philosophers, psychologists and economists
in cross-disciplinary debates about human altruism.
Introduction
When a single term covers diﬀerent concepts in diverse
disciplines and when scholars from these disciplines read
each other’s papers, major confusions are to be expected.
Mother Teresa’s self-abnegation for the sake of the poor of
Calcutta, and the reproductive restraint of ant workers are
obviously distinct phenomena, yet both are described as
altruistic (see Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3). Mother Ter-
esa’s altruism refers to the common-sense use of the term –
she is motivated by other-directed goals – whereas ants’
altruism refers to a technical term well-deﬁned in biology
and independent of any moral consideration. Hence, ants
qualify for altruism, as does Mother Teresa, but the two
forms of altruism are not equivalent.
This chapter provides the conceptual tools necessary for
understanding and evaluating the original contribution of
various research areas involved in the project of explaining
the broad phenomenon of unidirectional helping behav-
iour. The section ‘Altruism in Biology’ deals with the way
biologists deﬁne and explain altruism. The section
‘Reproductive versus Psychological Altruism’ is an intro-
duction to altruism as conceived in philosophy and the
social sciences. The section ‘The Relationship between
Reproductive and Psychological Altruism’ deals with the
relationship one can build between these twomain forms of
altruism. The section ‘Other Forms of Human Altruism’
draws attention to the ambiguous use of the term altruism
in recent anthropology and economics literature on human
altruism.
Altruism in Biology
In biology, altruism is generally deﬁned as a behaviour that
increases other organisms’ ﬁtness and permanently
decreases the actor’s own ﬁtness (Frank, 1998; Grafen,
1985; West et al., 2007). We label this form of altruism
‘reproductive altruism’. Fitness is deﬁned as the number of
an actor’s oﬀspring that survive to adulthood (Hamilton,
1964: 1). In this acceptation, ﬁtness is an absolute value –
for example, ameerkat with four oﬀspring at the end of her
life has a ﬁtness of four. This value however, only makes
sense when compared to the ﬁtness of other individuals
in the population – for example, four oﬀspring might be
a great, medium or low reproductive achievement,
depending on how many oﬀspring meerkats usually have.
Classical examples of ‘reproductive altruism’ are found
in the worker castes of eusocial insects such as termites,
ants, some bees and some wasps. In these species, the
workers are mostly sterile – their direct ﬁtness is zero – and
they raise the oﬀspring of the queens and males. Altruistic
castes have been reported in several other invertebrates,
including gall-making aphids and thrips, snapping shrimps
and ﬂatworms, as well as in two species of mole rats. Such
permanently sterile castes should be seen as the endpoint of
a continuum. Less pronounced forms of reproductive
altruism and cooperation are widely distributed, from
bacteria and amoebae to cooperatively breeding birds and
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Reproductive altruism is an extreme form of helping
behaviour, the evolution of which cannot be accounted for
in terms of future reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) or individual
reputation (Zahavi, 1975). It poses a challenge for evo-
lutionary theorists because natural selection should favour
traits increasing the reproduction of their bearers. Since
altruistic behaviours are, by deﬁnition, detrimental with
respect to survival and reproduction, their persistence
in the course of evolution calls for a special explanation.
See also: Theory of Cooperation
After several unsatisfying explanatory attempts (e.g.
Darwin, 2007/1871; Lorenz, 2004/1963; Wynne-Edwards,
1962), William Hamilton (1964, 1970, 1975) provided a
powerful explanation for reproductive altruism: kin selec-
tion theory. Hamilton generalised and formalised an idea
already alluded to by Fisher (1958) and Haldane (1955).
The latter famously said that he would jump into a river for
two brothers or eight cousins. The idea is that reproductive
altruism can be favouredwhen the altruists help genetically
related individuals, which carry identical copies of genes.
In a gene-centred formulation, genes responsible for
altruistic behaviour can spread in a population if the
altruistic behaviour they induce is more likely to beneﬁt
organisms who possess copies of the same altruistic genes
(Frank, 1998;Grafen, 1985;Hamilton, 1970;Queller, 1992;
West et al., 2011). Such a situation typically occurs among
close relatives, due to common ancestry. For example,
altruists may preferentially help their parents, sisters or
cousins, based on their ability to recognise close kin or
simply because they live in spatial proximity.
It isworth noting however, that commonancestry is only
oneway to increase the probability that the altruist and her
recipient share the gene – or complex of genes – for altru-
ism. Another way for altruists and recipients to share the
altruismgene is the so-called ‘green beard’ eﬀect, whereby a
gene for altruism is responsible for a visible phenotype – a
green beard or anything more realistic – that can be rec-
ognised by other altruists. If in addition, the tendency for
altruism is coupled with a preference for helping those
who share the visible phenotype, common ancestry is not
Figure 2 Altruism in ants: workers of Formica selysi take care of the
queen’s offspring. Photo courtesy of Joe¨l Meunier.
Figure 3 A memorial plate for Mother Teresa, an icon of human altruism.
Photo by Michal Manas. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Mother_Teresa_memorial_plaque.jpg
Figure 1 Altruism in ants: workers of Formica selysi groom the queen.
Photo courtesy of David Buchs, http://www.lesixiemecontinent.net/
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needed for altruism to spread in the population. In the
naturalworld, greenbeard cases havebeen reported (Keller
andRoss, 1998) but they are rare because helping otherwise
unrelated altruists is wasteful for all the genes of the
organisms except for the altruistic gene; thus, anymutation
that prevents this waste will be favoured by natural selec-
tion (Dawkins, 1979; Maynard Smith, 1976; Okasha,
2002). See also: Eusociality and Cooperation; Hamilton,
William Donald; Theory of Cooperation
Hamilton formulated a simple rule delineating when
reproductive altruism can evolve bykin selection: rb2c40,
where r is the coeﬃcient of genetic relatedness between the
altruistic actor and the recipient – which reﬂects the
probability that both individuals carry the gene for altru-
ism, compared to the population average (Frank, 1998), b
the ﬁtness beneﬁt of the altruistic behaviour for the
recipient and c the ﬁtness cost of the altruistic behaviour for
the actor. When the inequation is fulﬁlled, the altruist
transmits more copies of his genes by helping his relative
(rb) than by reproducing (c) and therefore reproductive
altruism can evolve.
In the literature, one canﬁndan alternativeway tomodel
the evolution of altruism. The ‘group selection’ approach
(Goodnight, 1990; Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Sober and
Wilson, 1998;Wade, 1977;Wilson, 1975) considers groups
as functional units and explicitly partitions selection into a
between-group and a within-group component. In some
circumstances, it might happen that an altruistic behaviour
is so favourable at the group level that it compensates for
the loss of individual ﬁtness within groups. Interestingly,
even if the twomethods lookat the samephenomenon from
diﬀerent perspectives, they rely on similar quantitative
genetic approaches and yield fully compatible results
(Gardner, 2008;Lehmann et al., 2007).UsingPrice’s (1970)
equation, several authors have demonstrated math-
ematically that the change of frequency of an altruistic gene
in a population can be equivalently expressed either in
terms of Hamilton’s rule or in terms of a partition of
selection within and between groups. In particular, the two
approaches concur in the view that true reproductive
altruism, with a permanent cost to the actor, will only
evolve in groups of genetically related individuals (e.g.
Frank, 1998; Gardner et al., 2007; Lehmann and Keller,
2006; Queller, 1992). See also: Group Selection; Selection:
Units and Levels
In practical cases, it might be diﬃcult to distinguish true
reproductive altruism from cooperation. Indeed, the long-
term individual costs and beneﬁts of a given behaviour are
often diﬃcult to measure. Many helping behaviours that
might seem altruistic at ﬁrst may provide delayed direct
ﬁtness beneﬁt. For example, vampire bats have been
observed to feed their oﬀspring as well as other individuals
of their group (Wilkinson, 1984). Under close observation,
it turns out that the latter pay back when they return
from a successful hunting night. This behaviour is more
correctly described as cooperative food sharing. Many
behaviours might also be altruistic in some circumstances
and cooperative in others. Finally, apparently altruistic
behavioursmay in fact confer delayed direct ﬁtness beneﬁts
through reputation or prestige. Helping behaviours may
indeed increase the individual reputation and be honest
signals, for example, for being a good mate or a reliable
partner for future cooperative interactions (Zahavi, 1975).
Reproductive altruism should not be confused with two
other notions found in the literature: ‘reciprocal altruism’
and ‘weak altruism’. In an important and inﬂuential paper,
Trivers (1971) discussed reciprocal behaviour of the form
‘help your neighbour as long as she helps you back’. He
labelled this behaviour ‘reciprocal altruism’, while making
it clear that it provides a long-term direct beneﬁt for its
bearer, and as such does not exemplify altruism in the
classical Hamiltonian sense deﬁned above. Reciprocal
altruism is a form of cooperative behaviour. One illus-
tration is the vampire bats food sharing example men-
tioned above.
Proponents of group selection theory often use a slightly
diﬀerent notion of altruism, labelled ‘weak altruism’
(Wilson, 1977). Weak altruism is not an absolute but a
relative value that compares the actor’s number of oﬀ-
spring to that of the recipients. To qualify as weakly
altruistic, a helping individual must be less ﬁt than the
group members who do not help, but beneﬁt from help.
Hence, this deﬁnition does not imply that altruistic indi-
viduals reduce their direct ﬁtness. To illustrate this point,
consider the case of an individual who builds a protective
wall around a common nest. The wall is costly to build but
this cost is compensated by the direct beneﬁts it provides to
the individual – say protection against ﬂoods. In this case,
the wall-building behaviour is not ‘reproductively altru-
istic’ because the individual cost is compensated by the
beneﬁt, but is ‘weakly altruistic’ – because the other nest
members beneﬁt from the wall without having to build it.
These conceptual distinctions allow us to solve some
apparent contradictions among authors. For example, in
two famous papers, Wilson (1975) and Hamilton (1975)
built very similar models for the evolution of a trait
that Wilson described as altruistic and Hamilton as
nonaltruistic. In fact, Wilson had ‘weak altruism’ in
mind whereas Hamilton referred to reproductive altruism.
See also: Group Selection; Selection: Units and Levels
These conceptual distinctions are also important to
avoid cross-disciplinary misunderstandings. In the
humanities and social sciences, scholars are often unaware
of the various forms of altruism used in biology. They
frequently mistake reproductive altruism for reciprocal
altruism or psychological altruism. After having heard of
Trivers’ theory, they infer that biologists deny the possi-
bility of any formof altruism thatwouldnot be individually
advantageous. This confusion is usually coupled with
misunderstandings about the level of selection. Indeed,
Hamilton’s explanation of the conditions under which
genes for altruism can be successfully passed on from one
generation to the next has been widely popularised by
Richard Dawkins (1976) in the terminology of the ‘selﬁsh
gene’. This metaphorical use of the term ‘selﬁsh’ for genes
simply emphasises the fact that genes are the basic unit of
Altruism – A Philosophical Analysis
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selection. Dawkins made it clear that ‘selﬁshness’ at the
genetic level did not imply selﬁshness at the social, indi-
vidual or psychological levels. However, this distinction is
widely overlooked by scholars who are not trained in
population genetics. Consequently, they erroneously think
(see for example Gintis et al., 2005; Sahlins, 1976) that
Hamilton and his followers, by adopting the gene-centred
point of view that is now standard in evolutionary biology,
deny the existence of any form of altruism.
Reproductive versus Psychological
Altruism
Evolutionary theorists deﬁne altruism in terms of its con-
sequences on the ﬁtness of individuals. This focus on the
outcomes of a behaviour, however, does not correspond to
the common-sense use of the term altruism, which is more
concernedwithwhatmotivates people to help. If wewere to
learn thatMotherTeresa became anunand served the poor
on the streets of Calcutta only because she feared going to
Hell, we would hardly describe her as an altruist. Con-
versely, a father might ruin himself to ﬁnance the legal
studies of his son with the genuine hope of providing him
with bright career opportunities and a happy future life,
but if his son’s secret dream is to become aballet dancer, the
father’s altruistic motive might fail to achieve the pur-
ported goal. Despite the father’s erroneous judgement
about what will make his son happy, common sense will
appreciate the altruistic nature of hismotivation, as long as
it is not tainted by self-directed calculations.
An important and longstanding cross-disciplinary
debate is based on this common-sense understanding of
altruism. The debate is about decidingwhether humans are
capable of ‘psychological altruism’, which, as the psych-
ologist Daniel Batson describes it, is ‘a motivational state
with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare’.
Under this acceptation, altruism refers to an ‘energy, a
force within the individual’ which drives the person to
achieve an other-directed goal (Batson, 1991: 6). Psycho-
logical altruism is mainly discussed in philosophical circles
(Butler, 1991/1726; Hutcheson, 2004/1725; Mandeville,
1997/1714–1728;Rand, 1964; Stich et al., 2010) aswell as in
the social sciencesmore generally, for example, psychology
(Batson, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1987) and sociology (Comte,
1851–1854).
In order to avoid confusion, it is important to under-
stand that reproductive altruism and psychological altru-
ism are two distinct notions (Sober andWilson, 1998). Ant
workers are paradigmatic examples of the former, but their
limited cognitive abilities do not permit them to con-
ceptualise others’ welfare. Thus, it does not even make
sense to ask the question whether they are psychological
altruists. Conversely, mothers caring for their oﬀspring are
not reproductive altruists although theymight be genuinely




The distinction between ultimate and proximate explan-
ations is central to evolutionary biology (Mayr, 1961).
Ultimate explanations refer to the adaptive value and ﬁtness
consequences of a trait; they answer the question of why a
trait has evolved. Proximate explanations provide details
about the causal mechanisms responsible for a trait. These
explanations are distinct but complementary. Biologists rely
on both to fully comprehend a phenomenon. For example,
kin selection elucidates why soldier ants defend their colony
against intruders threatening theirmother and relatives – an
ultimate explanation – whereas other studies provide details
on how these soldiers detect intruders thanks to their sen-
sitivity to chemical cues – a proximate explanation.
The samedistinctionapplies to the twowaysof conceiving
altruism presented in the previous sections. The Hamilto-
nian or group selection explanations for the evolution of
reproductive altruism are ultimate explanations for this
behaviour. In contrast, psychological altruism refers to
motivations that are causal mechanisms prompting indi-
viduals to take care of others’ welfare; this psychological
phenomenon provides a proximate explanation for the
broad phenomenon of unidirectional helping behaviour.
It should be clear, however, that the demonstration of an
individual’s altruistic motivation – proximate explanation
– does not indicate that this individual is reproductively
altruistic. For example, the individualmay care for his own
children.Conversely, anultimate evolutionary explanation
of reproductive altruism provides no direct insight into
whatmotivates individuals to help others – for example,we
do not know what worker ants think. There are however,
interesting indirect links between the two types of altruism.
If a form of reproductive altruism has been selected in
humans, there are good reasons to think that some prox-
imate mechanisms prompting this ﬁtness-costly behaviour
have co-evolved. Such proximate mechanisms might be
caring and empathic emotions, which may qualify as psy-
chological altruism (Clavien, 2012; Sober and Wilson,
1998).More generally,mechanismsbasedonpsychological
altruism such as caring and empathic emotions are eﬀective
ways to make individuals behave altruistically or
cooperatively, depending on whether or not these behav-
iours have long-term direct ﬁtness costs to the individual.
Thus, in highly cooperative species inwhich individuals are
endowed with developed cognitive and emotional capaci-
ties – such as humans and probably apes – various forms of
psychological altruism are likely to be selected (Clavien,
2010; Kitcher, 2011).
Other Forms of Human Altruism
More recently, the notion of altruism has been heavily used
in the emerging ﬁelds of experimental economics and
Altruism – A Philosophical Analysis
eLS & 2012, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. www.els.net4
evolutionary anthropology (de Quervain et al., 2004; Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2005; Henrich et al.,
2005: 812). This literature provides empirical data – gath-
ered in laboratory experiments – that highlight humans’
cooperative and fair behaviour. In these studies, the
meaning of the term altruism is variable and often
ambiguous (West et al., 2011). Sometimes, altruism refers
to a particular type of behaviour that can be observed in
socio-economic contexts, much in the same spirit as the
biological use of the term. At other times, altruism refers to
people’s willingness to cooperate and punish shirkers,
which is close to the common-sense use of the term.
However, a closer look at the literature shows that the
authors often use more fuzzy and less restrictive notions of
altruism than the ones presented above. Their outcome-
oriented notion is less restrictive than reproductive altru-
ism because they count any type of individual success –
rather than exclusively reproductive success – and show
little interest in the broad evolutionary impact of the
behaviours they observe in laboratory. Their motivation-
oriented notion refers to preferences, as deﬁned in neo-
classical economic theory, which are weak indicators of
people’s actual motivations. Overall, the results obtained
in these experiments are important for understanding
cooperation, but not reproductive altruism.
Conclusion
We have speciﬁed two main understandings of altruism.
The ﬁrst concentrates on the ﬁtness outcomes of a behav-
iour, whereas the second focuses on the individual motiv-
ation underlying an action. These two notions of altruism
are distinct but complementary ways of shedding light on
unidirectional helping behaviour. We have also hinted at
the fact that other concepts of altruism pervade current
literature on human altruism. We conclude that a true
interdisciplinary understanding of human altruism cru-
cially relies on distinguishing the multifarious notions
covered by the term altruism in diverse disciplines.
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